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[Crim. No. 10399. In Bank. Dec. 23, 1966.] 
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. LOUIS 
EUGENE SUDDUTH, Defendant and Appcllant. 
[1] Oriminal Law-Rights of Accused-Aid of Oounsel: Witnesses 
-Self-IncriminatioD-Physical Examination.-Su!'lpects have 
DO . constitutional right to refuse a test designed. to produce 
physical evidence in the form of a breath sample, regardless of 
whether counsel is present. 
[2] Evidence-Physical Oondition-Intoxication.-A blood alcohol 
test and the breath test for alcoholic absorption are alternate 
[2] See Oal.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 347; Am.Jur., Evidence (1st ed· 
§ 876). 
!ticK. Dig. References: [1] Criminal Law, § 107; Witnesses, 
§ 24; [2] Evidence, § 490; [3] Criminal Law, §§ 103, 628(1); [4] 
Automobiles and Other Road Vebicles, § 400(1); [5] Criminal 
Law, § 621; [6] Criminal Law, § 625. 
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means to determine the percentage of alcohol in the blood, and 
the value of such objective scientific data of intoxication to 
supplement the fallible observations by humans of behavior 
seemingly symptomatic of intoxication cannot be disputed. 
[3] Criminal Law-Rights of Accused: Argument of Counsel-
Comment on Defendant's Failure to Testify.-The rule against 
comment- on an accused's failure to testify is a necessary 
protection for the exercise of the underlying privilege of 
remaining silent, but a refusal to cooperate with law enforce· 
ment officers does not qualify for such protection. 
[4] Automobiles- Offenses-Driving While Intoxicated-Instruc-
tions.-In a prosecution for the misdemeanor of driving while 
intoxicated, where an instruction by the court on defendant's 
refusal to submit to a sobriety test specifically referred to 
refusal to take a breathalyzer test or other sobriety test after 
he was made aware of the nature of the test and its effect, and 
where the prosecutor did not comment on defendant's failure 
to answer questions, but only on his refusal to take tests, it 
could not be said that the jury was erroneously authorized to 
consider, as evidence of guilt, defendant's exercise of his right 
to remain silent in response to questions at the time of his 
arrest. 
[6] Criminal Law-Argument of Counsel-Scope-Statements in 
Refutation.-In a prosecution for the misdemeanor of driving---
while ,intoxicated, defense counsel has the right to argue 
reasons alternative to consciousness of guilt to explain defend-
ant's refusal to take a sobriety test. . 
[6] Id.-Argument of Counsel-Scope-Arguing Law.-The trial 
court in a criminal case may, in its discretion, allow defense 
counsel to incorporate correct statements of law in his argu. 
ment, but the court must sustain an objection to an incorrect 
statement of law, such as an incorrect assumption in argument 
that one prosecuted for driving while intoxicated had the 
constitutional right to refuse a breathalyzer test. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Municipal Court of the 
Los Angeles Judicial District of Los Angeles County. Charles 
M. H ughes, Judge. Affirmed. 
Prosecution for misdemeanor of driving while intoxicated. 
Judgment of conviction affirmed. 
Morris Lavine, Norman T. Ollestad and Richard E. Erwin 
for Defendant and Appellant. 
Roger Arnebergh, City Attorney, Philip E. Grey, Assistant 
City Attorney, and Michael T. Sauer, Deputy City Attorney, 
for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
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TRAYNOR, C. J.-A municipal court jury found defend-
ant guilty of the misdemeanor of driving while under the 
influence of intoxicating liquor (Veh. Code, § 23102). J udg-
ment was entered on the verdict, and defendant appealed, 
contending that his privilege against self-incrimination was 
violated by the admission of evidence of, and by the comment 
on, his refusal to take a breathalyzer test to determine the 
percentage of alcohol in his blood. The appellate department 
of the superior court affirmed the judgment. The Court of 
Appeal transferred the case on its own motion because of the 
constitutional question involved (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 
62(a» and affirmed the judgment. We granted a hearing 
because substantially the same constitutional question was 
before us in People v. Ellis, Crim. 10346, ante, p. 529 [55 
Cal.Rptr. 385, 421 P.2d 393]. 
Officer Wilson of the Los Angeles Police Department testi-
fied that in response to a radio call reporting a driver under 
the influence of intoxicating liquor he and a fellow officer 
stopped defendant's car, which answered the radioed descrip-
tion and was observed making an unusual turning maneuver. 
Defendant was very unsteady when he got out of his car and 
approached the officers, and he produced his driver's license 
only after considerable fumbling in his wallet. His breath 
smelled strongly of alcohol. 
Officer Wilson informed defendant of his rights to counsel 
and to remain silent and that anything he said could be used 
against him in a criminal proceeding. The officer then tried to 
explain and demonstrate a series of tests, known collectively as 
the Field Sobriety Examination, he proposed to administer to 
defendant. The examination consists of physical tests, such as 
walking a straight line, and a series of questions. While stand-
ing with the officers defendant was swaying to and fro and 
kept up a running line of one-sided conversation with Officer 
Wilson's partner. Defendant refused to take any of the physi-
cal tests and refused to answer any question except to respond 
with exculpatory statements to the inquiry as to how much he 
had drunk. Defendant was then taken to the police station 
where the equipment necessary to administer a breathalyzer 
test was assembled and its operation explained to him. He 
refused to take the test. 
The evidence of defendant's refusals to take tests was 
commented on in the prosecutor's argument, and the jury was 
instructed on the significance of such evidence. 
The reasoning in People v. Ellis, Crim. 10346, decided 
fl6C.Jd-li 
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today, ante, p. 529 [55 Cal.Rptr. 385, 421 P.2d 393], is 
fully applicable to the question whether evidence of and 
comment on defendant's refusal to submit to a breathalyzer 
test is constitutionally admissible. [1] Suspects have no 
constitutional right to refuse a test designed to produce physi. 
cal evidence- in the form of a breath sample (cf. ante, pp. 
533-536; People v. Zavala (1966) 239 Cal.App.2d 732, 738. 
739 [49 Cal.Rptr. 129]; People v. Dawson (1960) 184 Cal. 
App.2d Supp. 881, 883 [7 Cal.Rptr. 384]) whether or not 
counsel is present (People v. Gilbert (1965) 63 Ca1.2d 690, 709 
[47 Cal.Rptr. 909, 408 P.2d 365]). 
[2] We note that the physical and psychological disturb-
ance of the individual involved in obtaining a breath sample is 
apt to be significantly less than that involved in extracting a 
blood sample, an evidence-gathering technique recently 
approved in Schmerber v. Oalifornia (1966) 384 U.S. 757 [16 
L.Ed.2d 908, 86 S.Ct. 1826], and that the blood alcohol test 
and the breath test for alcoholic absorption are alternate 
means for determining the percentage of alcohol in the blood.1 
The value of such objective scientific data of intoxication to 
supplement the fallible observations by humans of behavior 
seemingly symptomatic of intoxication cannot be disputed • 
. (People y. Duroncelay (1957) 48 CaI.2d 766, 772 [312 P.2d 
690] .) In a day whell excessive loss of life and property is 
caused by inebriated ;drivers, an imperative need exists for a 
fair, efficient," and accurate system of detection, enforcement 
and, hence, prevention. (See Breithaupt v. Abram (1957) 352 
U.S. 432, 439 [1 L.Ed.2d 448,77 S.Ot. 408].) . 
As in Ellis (People v. Ellis, Crim.. 10346, ante, p .. 529 
[55 Cal.Rptr. 385, 421 P.2d 393]), defendant's reliance ---
on Griffin v. Oalifornia, 380 U.S. 609 [14 L.Ed.2d 106, 85 S.Ct. 
1229], must be rejected. [3] The sole rationale for the rule 
against comment on a failure to testify is that such a rule is a 
necessary protection for the exercise of the underlying· privi-
lege of remaining silent (id. at p. 614). A wrongful refusal to 
cooperate with law enforcement officers does not qualify for 
such protection. A refusal that might operate to suppress evi· 
dence of intoxication, which disappears rapidly with the 
passage of time (In re Newbern (1959) 175 CaI.App.2d 862, 
866 [1 Cal.Rptr. 80] ), should not be encouraged as a device to 
escape prosecution. 
lSee PeoplB v. Kovacik (1954) 205 Misc. 275, 282-290 [128 N.Y.S.2d 
492, 499-506], tor a discussion ot the development of, and seientitle basia 
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The disparate results found in otller jurisdictions may be 
ascribed to the presence or absence of an underlying constitu-
tional or statutory right to refuse to produce the physical 
evidence sought.2 States that recognize a right to refuse to 
take such tests exclude evidence of a refusal.s States that 
recognize no right to refuse allow testimony and comment 011 
the refusal. 4 
[4] It is contended that the instruction IS given by the 
court on defendant's refusal to submit to a sobriety test 
erroneously authorized the jury to consider defendant '8 
silence in response to questions at the time of his arrest, when 
such silence could not be considered evidence of guilt because 
it was an exercise of his constitutional right.6 We do not 
believe, however, that the jury would understand the instruc-
tion to refer to defendant's refusal to answer questions as 
distinguished from his refusal to participate in a test. The 
instruction specifically refers to refusal to take "a breath-
alyzer test or other sobriety test after he or she has been 
[made] aware of the nature of the test and its effect" and the 
prosecutor did not comment on defendant's failure to answer 
questions, but only on his re~usal to take tests. 
[5] Defendant contends that the trial court erred in 
sustaining an objection to his counsel's argument to the jury 
2See Note 87 A.L.R.2d 370. 
8Not unanimously, however. (State v. Boc'k (1958) 80 Idaho 296 [328 
P.2d 1065, 1071-1073].) 
4See Note 87 A.L.R.2d 370. 
Ii"YOU ARE INSTRUCTED that ina case where a defendant is 
accused of violating Section 23101 of the Vehicle Code it is permissible 
to prove that the defendant was offered a breathalyzer test or other 
sobriety test after he or she has been aware of the nature of the test and 
its effect. The fact that such test is refused under such circumstances is 
not sufficient standing alone and by itself to establish the guilt of a 
defendant but is a fact which if proven may be considered by you in the 
light of all other proven facts in deciding the question of guilt or inno-
eence. Whether or not such conduct shows a consciousness of guilt and 
the significance to be attached to such a circumstance are matters for your 
,determination. ' , 
OBoth the federal rule, e.g., Ivey v. United States (1965) 344 F.2d 770, 
772-773; Helton v. United States (1955) 221 F.2d 338, 341-342, appli-
cable to the states through Malloy v. Hogan (1964) 378 U.S. 1 [12 
L.Ed.2d 653, 84 S.Ct; 1489J, and our own rule, People v. Simmons (1946) 
28 Cal.2d 699, 718-719 [172 P.2d 18], might have operated to exclude 
the testimony of defendant's silence in response to questions by tbe police. 
(Cf. Griffin v. Oalifornia (1965) supra, 380 U.S. 609, 614.) Defendant's 
failure to object precludes his challenging the admission of the evidence 
of refusal to answer questions. The issue here, tberefore, is limited to the 
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on his refusal to take the sobriety test." Counsel has the right 
to argue reasons alternative to consciousness of guilt to 
explain defendant's refusal. [6] Moreover, the court may 
in its discretion even allow counsel to incorporate correct 
statements of law in his argument (People v. Linden (1959) 
52 Ca1.2d 1, 29 [338 P.2d 397] ; People v. Dykes (1930) 107 
Cal.App. 107, 118 [290 P. 102]), but it must sustain an objec-
tion to an incorrect statement of law (Peop18 v. Atwood, 214 
Cal.App.2d 308, 309 [29 Cal.Rptr. 463]). In the present case 
the court sustained an objection to, and ordered stricken, only 
that part of counsel's argument that incorrectly assumed that 
defendant had a constitutional right to refuse the test. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
McComb, J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Mosk, J., Burke, J., 
Peek, J., ~ concurred. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied January 
19, 1967. 
1" I submit there is a lot of evidence about refusing to take the test. 
It is always kind of puzzling to me how they can advise somebody, 'Now, 
listen, Mr. Sudduth, you don't have to take this test it you don't want to. 
You can see an attorney if you want to.' Or I You don't have to make 
any statement it you don't want to.' And then they are amazed or 
astounded when the man says, I Well, you advised me of my rights; I'n--
follow your advice. I won't take the test.' They make a big thing out 
of refusal to take the test. 1 am wondering abouf tlls sf/ect 01 a C01&8ti-
tuti01&al right if wlle1l you take advantage 01 it ami if U 1/,8ed against 
you i1l court. 
II MR. REISNER : Well, your Honor, that would be a matter of law and 
it has certainly been decided it is a valid comment and inference. 
II THE COURT: The last comment of counsel will be stricken. They are 
not to decide the legal aspects of what is a Constitutional right and what 
is not. That will be stricken." (Italics added.) 
·Retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court sittinlr under assilrn• 
ment by the Chairman of the Judicial Council. 
I 
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